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1975-2000 was the golden age of smallholder irrigation in south Asia. Until then, much of the irrigation in the region depended on gravity flow, and was confined to the com-
mand areas of canal systems and traditional irrigation structures 
such as tanks, ponds and ahar-pyne systems. Since 1975, the 
spontaneous boom in private investment in small boreholes 
and mechanised diesel and electric pumps revolutionised irriga-
tion agriculture taking it beyond the command areas to every 
nook and corner of the sub-continent. This happened at a time 
when growing population pressure made it imperative for 
marginal farmers to intensify their farming to ensure food for 
their family and liveli hood security. The mushrooming of local, 
informal and fragmented pump irrigation service markets, 
through which the poor could access irrigation from pump 
owners, vastly expanded the productivity and equity impacts 
of this irrigation boom. Govern ment policies supported the 
pump irrigation revolution through the expansion of institu-
tional credit, a variety of subsidy schemes on borings and 
pumps, and support to farm electrification and electricity sub-
sidies. While pumps and boreholes emerged as the mainstay 
of smallholder irrigation, new concerns about the threat of 
groundwater depletion, and adverse impacts of electricity sub-
sidies on the viability of the electricity industry emerged. How 
to cool this overheated pump irrigation economy has emerged 
as one of the trickiest water policy issues in the region.
Since 2000, however, all available evidence suggests that the 
region’s groundwater economy has begun shrinking in response 
to a growing energy squeeze. This energy squeeze is a combined 
outcome of three factors: (a) progressive reduction in the quan-
tity and quality of power supplied by power utilities to agri-
culture as a desperate means to contain farm power subsidies; 
(b) growing difficulty and rising capital costs of acquiring new 
electricity connections for tubewells; and (c) an eightfold increase 
in the nominal price of diesel during 1990-2007, a period dur-
ing which the nominal rice price rose by less than 50 per cent. 
In a 2002 survey of over 2,600 tubewell owners we carried out 
in India, Pakistan, Nepal terai and Bangladesh, our respondents 
unanimously ranked “energy cost and availability” as the top 
challenge to their farming, far above “groundwater depletion”, 
“high rate of well failure”, and “rising groundwater salinity” 
[Shah et al 2006]. Since the time of our survey, diesel prices 
have jumped over 70 per cent; there is no surprise then that 
the diesel price squeeze on small-scale irrigation is heading 
towards a crisis in all the countries of south Asia but this is 
particularly visible in eastern India and the Nepal terai where 
the ratio of rice to diesel price has turned particularly adverse 
as evident in Table 1. 
Of even greater significance for the poor is the response of pump 
rental prices to the rise in diesel prices because the poorest 
strata of India’s peasantry depend on water markets to secure 
their irrigation. Because water markets are natural oligopolies 
[Shah 1993], pump owners use diesel price increases to raise 
their pump rental rates in tandem with every major rise in 
diesel prices despite the fact that pumps themselves have become 
cheaper during 1990-2007. Figure 1 shows the changes in the 
nominal price of diesel versus the price of pump irrigation in 
Mirzapur, Uttar Pradesh. Between 1990 and 2007, diesel prices 
here have risen from Rs 46/l to Rs 34.8 but the rate buyers incur 
per hour of pump irrigation has increased from Rs 23-25 to 
Rs 90-95 per hour, far larger than that needed to cover the increase 
in fuel cost. Another characteristic of this relationship has been 
the downward stickiness of pump irrigation prices. Every time 
there is a big increase in the diesel price, the pump irrigation 
price tends to jump. However, the reverse is never the case.
As a result, pump rentals relative to farm produce prices – 
which is what matters to the marginal farmers and sharecroppers 
– have risen even faster than diesel prices relative to rice and 
wheat prices. In Deoria, eastern Uttar Pradesh, a marginal 
farmer could buy an hour of pump irrigation for the farm gate 
price of a little over 3 kg of rice and wheat in 1990. Today, 
this ratio is 10 kg of wheat and 12 kg of rice (Figure 2). 
Crop Per Drop of Diesel?
Energy Squeeze on India’s Smallholder Irrigation 
India’s smallholder irrigation is in the grip of an energy squeeze and is proving the 
proverbial last straw on the camel’s back. Marginal farmers and sharecroppers are 
particularly badly hit. Typically, they depend on pump owners for renting pumps, and even as 
prices have stayed put, the rental rates have risen in tandem with 
every diesel price hike because of the monopoly power of pump owners in these 
localised, village-level, informal oligopolies. Pump rentals have also tended to be downwardly 
sticky – they rise when diesel prices jump but stay put when fuel prices fall. This paper 
synthesises the results of 15 village studies to understand the impact of the energy squeeze and 
explores the desperate responses smallholders are forging to cope with or absorb the 
energy shock, and somehow stay in irrigated agriculture.  
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Table 1: Farm Gate Rice Price Relative to Diesel Price 
in South Asia
 Diesel Price:  Farm Gate Kg of Rice Needed
 February 2007 Rice Price:   to  Buy a Litre 
  February 2007   of Diesel
 
India (Indian Rs) 34.0 6.4 5.7 
Pakistan (Pak Rs) 37.8 11.8 3.2 
Bangladesh (Taka) 35.0 9.0 3.9 
Nepal terai (Nepal Rs) 57.0 10.0 5.7
 
Source: Field research results by IWMI researchers.
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Electric tubewells, subject to flat horse-power linked tariff 
are cheaper to operate than diesel pumps; their owners also sell 
pump irrigation at much lower rates compared to diesel pump 
owners. Therefore, new electricity connections are avidly sought 
after. However, most states – which in the early 1960s gave 
district collectors monthly targets for a minimum number of 
tubewells to be electrified – now have an embargo on new 
electricity connections to tubewells and where they are issued, 
the entire cost of taking the power line to the tubewell (of poles, 
cables and transformers) is charged to the farmer. This has made 
new electricity connections scarce as well as prohibitively 
costly. Even so, existing electric tubewell owners, and marginal 
farmers who are close enough to tubewells to buy pump irrigation 
from them are luckier compared to diesel pump owners and 
their buyers as is evident from Table 2. Since farmers who can 
buy pump irrigation from electric tubewell owners incur lower 
costs than when using their own diesel pumps, diesel pump 
owners in Uttar Pradesh today prefer purchased irrigation from 
electric tubewells rather than irrigating with own diesel pump.
This paper summarises the results of 15 village studies car-
ried out in different parts of India – with the participation of 
location-based researchers – to evolve a first-cut assessment 
of the variegated impacts of the energy squeeze on small-
holder irrigation with groundwater that has come to dominate 
Indian agriculture during the recent decades. The aim of the 
studies was to explore, identify and document rather than to 
measure and quantify these impacts. The only way we can 
analyse whether some impact is more widespread than others 
is by enumerating the number of case study villages where 
these occurred (in the opinion of our research partners). This 
enumeration is set out in Table 3, which suggests that the 
groundwater economy in many parts of India, especially in the 
east, is shrinking; that marginal farmers and sharecroppers have 
taken the brunt of the energy squeeze, and these are struggling 
to survive in irrigation by fashioning a variety of desperate 
responses to the energy squeeze.
Figure 1: Diesel Price Rise and Pump Irrigation Price:
Mirzapur, UP
Source: From the Mirzapur case study.
Figure 2: Deoria: Relative Price of Diesel and Diesel Pump 
Irrigation with Respect to Farm Gate Food Prices
K
g
Source: The Deoria case study.
Table 2: Cost of Irrigating Acre of Sugarcane in Village 
Akataha, Deoria, Eastern Uttar Pradesh
(Rs per acre)
 Diesel Pump  Electric Pump 
 
Own irrigation source 1,620 3 7  
Purchased pump irrigation 3,780 1,080
 
Source: Case study of the Akataha village.
Table 3: Three Most Important Responses of Farmers to Energy Squeeze in Study Villages
 Village Study Location Most Important Response Second Most Important Response Third Most Important Response
 
1 Kendradangal, Birbhum,  Decline in pump irrigated boro  Marginal farmers and share Kerosene/crude as a diesel
 West Bengal rice area croppers exit farming  substitute  
2 Kaya, Murshidabad, West Bengal Shift to low-water using crops Chinese pumpsets Kerosene as a diesel substitute 
3 Ferozpur Ranyan, Haryana Give fewer irrigations; same crop pattern  Water conveyance through pipes Exodus of marginal farmers from  farming 
4 Purana Pradhan, Khurda,  Install electric pump or buy from Switch to high-value crops Move out of pump irrigated agriculture
	 Coastal	Orissa	 electrified	borewells	 	 			
5 Badhkummed, Ujjain, Madhya Pradesh  Turned to electric pumps Decline in diesel pump irrigated area Irrigate fewer times
6  Berkhedakurmi, Sehore,  Increase in irrigation with electric Decline in area under diesel pump Switch from sugarcane to wheat and
 Madhya Pradesh pumps irrigation gram 
7 Lilapur, Rajkot, Gujarat 20-25 per cent decline in rabi irrigation Increased irrigation interval Small bed and alternate furrow irrigation
8 Jawrabodi, Vidarbha, Maharashtra Increased irrigation interval Optimising on rainfall/life-saving  Reduced irrigated area
   irrigation  
9 Keotkuchi, Barpeta, Assam Diesel pumps run on kerosene Decline in pump irrigation Farmers quitting farming 
10 Dharamgarh, Kalahandi, Orissa Increased use of canal irrigation   High-value crops Longer irrigation interval
  and manual lifting  
11 Shergarh, Hoshiarpur, Punjab Farmers lease out lands to Bihar  Distress shift to off-farm livelihoods Optimising water application
  labourers  
12 Veerpur, Banswara, Rajasthan Kerosene used to run diesel pumps Longer irrigation interval Pump irrigation concentrated on   
    vegetables for market 
13 Simra, Phulwari, Bihar Return to rainfed paddy in kharif   Pump irrigation concentrated on Sharecropping with purchased
  and pulses in rabi summer onion for market irrigation declining 
14	 Akataha,	Deoria,	Eastern	UP	 Increased	dependence	on	flow		 Pump	irrigation	concentrated	on	 Longer	irrigation	interval
  irrigation high-value crops  
15 Abakpur Mobana, Mirzapur,  Pump irrigation concentrated on Irrigation interval longer Water saving crops
 Uttar Pradesh cash crops
Source: From the case studies carried out by the author and his research partners.  
kg of wheat to buy one 1 litre of diesel
kg of wheat to pay for one hour of pump irrigation
kg of rice to buy 1 litre of diesel
kg of rice to buy one hour of pump irrigation
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I
Withering Water Markets? 
Most social impacts of the energy squeeze on smallholder 
irrigation (and the agrarian poor) work out through groundwater 
markets. Around 1990 and before, when diesel was one-eighth 
its price today, and farm power supply better than today, electric 
tubewell owners were natural oligopolists forced to behave in 
a highly competitive market [Shah 1993]. Flat electricity tariff, 
which reduced their marginal cost of pumping to near-zero 
levels created a powerful incentive for them to maximise pump 
irrigation sales, and in the process, pare down the prices. Diesel 
pump operators were able to offer some competition because 
diesel prices were low and their portability allowed diesel pumps 
to irrigate areas that electric tubewells could not reach. Numerous 
field-based studies showed that such local groundwater markets 
emerged as the mainstay of ultra-marginal farmers and share 
croppers, especially in eastern India and Bangladesh. In 
Bangladesh, Fujita and Hussain (1995) noted that thanks to 
pump irrigation markets, “the economic value of land...has 
decreased in a relative sense” in farm income generation and 
“opportunities for the landless and near-landless to climb the 
social ladder [have] expanded greatly”.  In Uttar Pradesh, 
Niranjan Pant (2005) wrote: “...the smallest farmers with land-
holdings up to 0.4 ha are the largest beneficiaries of the ground-
water markets as 60 per cent of the farmers of this category 
irrigated their wheat crop by water purchased from the owners 
of private water extraction devices...” Shah and Ballabh (1997), 
based on a study of water markets in six villages of north 
Bihar, concluded that these had opened up new production 
possibilities for the poor, which left them better off than before, 
and thereby imparted a new dynamism to the region’s peasant 
economy. Even Wilson (2002), otherwise critical of profiteering 
by water sellers in Bihar, wrote: “extension of irrigation through 
hiring out (mobile diesel pump sets) to small and marginal 
holdings is in fact the major factor accounting for the further 
increase since 1981-82 in cultivated area irrigated at least once 
to approximately 73 per cent in 1995-96. Those hiring in pump 
sets are overwhelmingly small and marginal cultivators; they 
cultivate an average of 1.35 acres (compared with an average 
of 3.89 acres cultivated by pump set owners)...” Most recently, 
Mukherji (2006) in an extensive study of water markets in West 
Bengal reaffirmed their myriad benefits to the agrarian poor. 
Water markets, and indeed groundwater irrigation itself, have been 
a source of much succor to the agrarian poor. Studying rural 
poverty ratios across the Indian states over five points between 
1973-74 and 1993-94, Narayanmorthy (2007) concluded that, 
“there is a significant inverse relationship between the availability 
of groundwater irrigation and the percentage of rural poverty...”
With soaring diesel prices and shrinking power supply to 
tubewells, this happy situation has rapidly changed for the 
worse. Pump irrigation markets, which boomed during the 
1980s and 1990s and probably served more area than all public 
irrigation systems in India [Mukherji 2005] are shrinking 
rapidly, and so is the size of the groundwater irrigation 
economy itself. During the 1980s and 1990s millions of farmers 
in northern and eastern India purchased diesel pumps often as 
stand-bys for their increasingly unreliable electric pumps. Now 
these have come full circle; diesel becoming unaffordable, 
especially for water buyers, the preference for electric tubewells 
has increased. However, electric tubewells are unable to meet 
these expectations because electricity supply as well as connections 
are dwindling.
In eastern India, Nepal terai and Bangladesh, electric tubewells 
are few and far between. Where we find some, two impacts 
follow: first, their owners find their monopoly power enhanced, 
which they use to increase their share in groundwater markets 
and irrigation surplus. Second, they are able to moderate the 
energy squeeze on marginal farmers, especially when the 
power supply situation is good and tubewell owners pay flat 
electricity tariff. We found this to be the case in Uttar Pradesh 
(UP), West Bengal and Orissa. Where they are found in sig-
nificant numbers, electric tubewell owners have driven diesel 
pump owners out of business. So unequal is the competition 
that even owners of diesel pumps prefer to purchase irrigation 
from electric tubewell owners rather than use their own diesel 
pumps (ibid). In UP, a 5 hp electric tubewell connection is a 
cash-cow for its owner: it entails a monthly charge of Rs 410 
but can generate up to Rs 9,000 per month as gross income 
from water sale, a highly profitable proposition. In Birbhum, 
West Bengal, our researcher wrote, “...by charging such a high 
price for electric pump irrigation, the submersible owners are 
getting their own irrigation free of cost and, on top of that, they 
make some profit as well.” Here, the flat tariff paid by electric 
submersibles increased from Rs 5,460 to Rs 8,950 per year 
between 1990 and 2007. In response, irrigation rates charged 
for boro rice too doubled from Rs 450 to Rs 900 per bigha. 
This rise was much smaller than the rise in the cost of purchased 
diesel pump irrigation. This has diverted the diesel pump owners’ 
business to electric tubewell owners and served to strengthen 
their monopoly power. While electric submersible owners make 
merry, it is also increasingly the case that marginal farmers of 
Bengal can grow boro rice only if they can tie up irrigation 
with an electric shallow/mini-deep tubewell owner.
The succor private electric tubewells can provide to the poor 
is limited by West Bengal government’s policy, which seems 
designed to minimise new connections for electric tubewells 
and ensure that the poor do not get them. To promote boro 
irrigation, the government initiated a scheme to issue temporary 
seasonal connections. In 2003, temporary connections were 
offered to Birbhum farmers for boro rice at Rs 7,000 for three 
months. In our study village, seven diesel pump owners took 
advantage of this. The next year, the tariff was jacked up to 
Rs 18,000, which put paid to the boro season electrification. 
Permanent connections are preferred by all but take three to 
four years to get approved and cost a prohibitive Rs 1.25-1.3 lakhs 
for poles, 11 KV cables, a 10 KW transformer and an electronic 
metre. The only farmer in our study village could afford such 
a mini-deep connection had seven acres of his own land and 
five acres of neighbouring land to command.
The ability of flat-tariff paying electric tubewells to moderate 
the impact of the diesel price squeeze is undermined by three 
factors: (a) inadequate supply of new electricity connections for 
irrigation; (b) the prohibitively high cost of installing new con-
nections; and (c) low amount and quality of power supply to 
agriculture. We found new electricity connections easily and 
quickly available in Uttar Pradesh but the demand was subdued 
because the farmer had to pay for the cost of laying the cable, 
poles and transformer, too – which may add up to Rs 1,00,000 
or more. In Kalahandi villages in Orissa, we found electricity 
supply plentiful, and electric tubewell costs one-seventh of what 
it costs to operate a diesel pump of comparable output. However, 
an electric pump 500 m away from the village may cost Rs 40,000 
in cables and poles besides the cost of the well, pumpset pump 
house, starter, etc. As a result, in our study village, we found that 
only six large farmers owned electric pumps while small farmers 
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managed with either their own or rented diesel pumps. The 
large farmers are able to earn Rs 30,000-35,000 per year (net) 
from their tubewell in crop-sharing contracts, which implies a 
decent rate of return on their capital investment. However, the 
entry-barrier in the form of high capital costs keeps smallholders 
from this benefit. In West Bengal, even if the farmers were 
willing to incur such high costs, connections were hard to come 
by in many areas primarily because of the state water investi-
gation department (SWID)’s sometimes exaggerated concern 
about over-exploitation of the groundwater resource. 
In Bihar, all the three disabling factors were in full play. In 
a rare exception, in Simra village in the Patna district, we found 
over 100 electric tubewells in operation. But since the uncertain, 
halting and mostly nightly power supply in the village never 
exceeds six hours/day, and that too with a dozen or more trips, 
the water buyers had to depend heavily on renting diesel pumps 
at Rs 35/hour (excluding fuel and Mobil) as electric pump owners 
had hardly enough electricity to irrigate their own crops. 
The only location – out of the 15 we studied across India 
– where the energy squeeze left farming unperturbed was 
water-abundant Kerala. Diesel pump irrigation disappeared from 
Kerala in the 1970s as the government set up electricity infra-
structure in the nook and corner of the country. However, 
Kerala agriculture and its irrigation are in the throes of profound 
change. The state invested large sums in creating paddy irrigation 
infrastructure, but thanks to labour and land shortages, soaring 
farm wage rates, and a roaring money order economy, land use 
in Kerala is rapidly shifting away from paddy and toward 
plantation crops, mainly rubber, banana, areca nut and coconut. 
Much of the plantation economy is built around homesteads where 
dug-wells, augmented by bores at the bottom double up for 
domestic use as well as for watering the home garden. Farmers 
lift the small quantity of water needed to water their trees manu-
ally or by using small electric motor-pumps. The village we 
covered, Thekkamkara in the Trichur district, was an atypical 
Kerala village with proliferation of kerosene pumps. Energy 
squeeze is not a serious issue here, yet, the government has a 
scheme to supply three litres/month of subsidised kerosene per 
acre to smallholders to soften the energy shock. A 1.5 hp kerosene 
pump can lift 25 cubic m of water and irrigate an acre in four 
hours. The energy cost of irrigation here must be less than 5 per 
cent of the value of output it supports compared to 25-35 per cent 
in northern and eastern India. Yet, we found a small political 
economy woven around kerosene distribution in Thrichur.
II
Return to Rainfed Farming
Leaving aside Kerala, elsewhere in India the energy squeeze 
is folding up the pump irrigation economy. Way back in the 1970s, 
economist Ishikawa (1967) called “irrigation” the leading input in 
agricultural growth. Post-1975, India’s smallholder agriculture 
boomed with supplemental irrigation made possible by diesel 
and electric pumps. However, all evidence we have suggests 
that the energy squeeze is forcing farmers, especially the mar-
ginal farmers and share croppers, to economise or even give up 
on this leading input. In groundwater-rich eastern Uttar Pradesh 
and Bihar, marginal farmers are withdrawing from wheat and 
sugarcane cultivation because they cannot afford the cost of 
supplemental irrigation with rented diesel pumps. In Gujarat as 
well as Vidarbha, our case studies showed that farmers depen-
dent on rented diesel pumps are replacing cultivation of rabi 
wheat with that of rainfed gram and other pulses. In West 
Bengal (and Bangladesh), all available evidence suggests that 
small farmers are compelled to give up boro rice cultivation, 
which has served as their food security passport for over two 
decades. In the Kaya village of Murshidabad, we found the 
most important result of rising diesel prices has been a decline 
in boro rice area from about 50 per cent of village farm land 
in the early 1990s to 20 per cent or less today. 
There is a strong scale-bias in the shrinking of boro rice area, 
with the agrarian poor hit the hardest. This was put in bold 
relief by the case study of the Kendradangal village in the 
Birbhum district in West Bengal. Electric tubewells, generally 
owned by influential, upper caste farmers, covered most of the 
village lands barring a small pocket of 70 ha with small parcels 
owned by schedule caste (SC) families. Post-1985, when the 
boro rice revolution overran Bengal, the electrified parts of the 
village experienced a productivity boom but the SC families 
irrigated boro rice with the help of 25 diesel pumps. Come 
2005, thanks to soaring diesel prices, only nine SC diesel pumps 
were in use; in the summer of 2006, the number dwindled to 
three. While the electrified part of Kendradangal continues with 
its boro rice binge, the SC farmers we interviewed lamented, 
“diesel pumps are fit to be thrown into compost pit”. Between 
1990 and 2006, boro rice irrigated with diesel shallows in the 
SC lands in Kendradangal fell from 60 ha to 16 ha. In the Kaya 
village of Murshidabad, SC farmers told us, “For us, the posi-
tive effect of the green revolution has been nullified due to 
diesel price hikes... boro paddy played a great role so far in 
feeding our families; in ‘amon’, it is impossible to grow the 
family’s rice requirement without cultivating a large field, but 
in boro because of very high yield, we could lease small plots 
and grow enough food for the family. But now boro paddy is 
beyond the reach of us marginal farmers.”
In the canal villages we covered in Kalahandi in Orissa, with 
diesel pump irrigation rates soaring from Rs 25 per hour in 
1995 to Rs 60 in 2007, pump rental markets have shrunk. Many 
mali farmers in this high-water table area took to the manual 
irrigation of vegetables by pots or by lifting water using dhen-
kuli from a depth of 10 feet in their four feet diameter open 
wells. Moreover, farmers renting diesel pumps shifted to diesel-
saving water melons on river banks besides taking to more di-
versified rainfed crops. In general, turning to rainfed cultivation 
of field crops like groundnut and black gram while expanding 
vegetable culti vation with pump irrigation for the nearby town 
– brinjal, cabbage, potato and watermelon, all of which are 
capital intensive and risky but produce high cash per unit of 
land – are the twin elements of the dominant livelihood strategy 
by small and marginal farmers in these wet villages.
A similar transition from pump irrigated crops to rainfed crops 
was noted in drier areas. In our Gujarat village in the Rajkot 
district, we found poor farmers giving up winter wheat to take 
to gram and pulses, besides some Bt cotton. In Ujjain, Madhya 
Pradesh, we found them switching from irrigation-dependent 
sugarcane, cotton and groundnut to rainfed soybean and gram. 
In gram, too, we found farmers taking to a drought-resistant 
“dollar” variety, giving up traditional varieties that gave better 
yield but needed irrigation. 
III
Sharecropper under Siege
The groundwater boom had powerful labour absorption impacts 
on agriculture but these are on the wane. In the Murshidabad 
village of Kaya, the decline in boro paddy and jute cultivation 
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depressed demand for labour. Boro paddy especially was much 
valued by marginal farmers since it absorbed family labour in 
productive subsistence farming. With boro paddy on the decline, 
menfolk of landless and marginal farmer households have been 
looking for work in brick kilns, National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Programme work or rickshaw-pulling and disguised 
unemployment among women has risen.  In the Simra village 
of Patna, Bihar, farm wage rates were Rs 15 in cash and two kg 
of rice, about the lowest in all the villages we covered. In onion 
fields, the wages offered were five kg of onion; and for ‘masoor’ 
harvesting, it was one bundle for every 18 bundles harvested. 
To make matters worse, highly elastic labour supply from neigh-
bouring villages kept Simra’s farm wage rates depressed.
Leasing small parcels of land for a fixed annual rent has been 
an important way for the landless to employ family labour to 
ensure food security. In Simra, in such ‘nagdi batai’ (or cash 
tenancy) contracts, a landless family leases in a hectare of land 
from an absentee land owner for a cash rent of Rs 14,000-20,000 
per year, and cultivates it with purchased pump irrigation. But this 
form of tenancy is on a decline because the landless and 
marginal farmers, 75 per cent of Simra’s households, find it 
increasingly difficult to make their tenancy viable. In Kendra-
dangal, our Birbhum village, we were told that for marginal 
farmers with diesel pumps, leasing in land for boro rice cultivation 
was very common until 2000. However, with rising diesel prices, 
this practice has all but disappeared; in 2006 only three marginal 
farmers leased only six or seven bighas for boro cultivation. In 
the Kaya village of Murshidabad, similarly, until a few years 
ago, it was common for landless or marginal farmers to lease 
small parcels of land for an annual rent of Rs 1,800-2,000/bigha 
(Rs 13,500-15,000 per ha). For crops like boro rice or vegetables, 
they could still manage by buying diesel pump irrigation. With 
present prices of diesel pump irrigation, however, this practice 
has almost ended, what with half or more of the boro produc-
tion claimed by the providers of land and water alone.
Instead of cash tenancy, crop-sharing for water is on rise in 
some parts. In the Rajkot village of Saurashtra, Gujarat, water 
buyers depend on renting diesel pumps only for supplemental 
irrigation in kharif. Renting diesel pumps for rabi crops, once 
widespread, has completely disappeared. Electric tubewell owners, 
who under Gujarat’s new Jyotirgram Scheme get eight hours 
of uninterrupted, full voltage power under a fairly high flat 
charge of Rs 850/hp/year, have moved in as aggressive sellers 
of pump irrigation service during rabi [Shah and Verma 2007]. 
The common arrangement is crop-sharing rather than cash sales: 
the land owner provides land and labour and the tubewell owner 
provides pump irrigation service. Both parties share other costs 
and output on a 50:50 basis. In this deal, then, the value of 
pump irrigation is equivalent to both land as well as labour. 
The rise in diesel prices has increased the rental value of 
surface irrigated land wherever surface irrigation is reliable. At 
the tail end of the upper Indravati system in the Kalahandi district 
of Orissa, Nayak reported that annual rent charged by command 
area farmers for one-tenth of a hectare rented for vegetable 
cultivation is Rs 1,000, while the rent for the a similar sized 
plot outside the canal command is just Rs 250 per year.
In the Kalahandi villages we covered in Orissa, electric pump 
owners generally provide irrigation services on a sharecropping 
basis and earn Rs 30,000-35,000 annually from selling water. 
In a standard contract, the pump owning large farmer usually 
contributes land and irrigation for groundnut while the tenant 
contributes labour. Both the parties share other costs and out-
put on a 50:50 basis. If a small farmer contributes land and 
labour and the pump owner contributes just irrigation, then the 
latter absorbs all costs of other inputs – mainly seeds and 
fertiliser, and both share the output equally.  
In coastal Orissa’s Purana Pradhan village, the cost price 
squeeze has forced many landless and marginal farmers to 
move to off-farm occupations. This has made more land avail-
able for the remaining landless to lease in for short-term crops 
like summer paddy as well as round the year vegetable culti-
vation. Even some women of the landless families now work 
on crop-share contracts rather than as casual farm workers.
IV
Hierarchy of Exit
In many of our case study villages, we discerned a curious 
hierarchy of exit from diesel pump irrigated farming – in which 
small and medium farmers migrate out of unviable irrigated 
farming but even poorer households reverse-migrate into irri-
gated farming. This was evident in Keotkuchi, our Assam 
village. In this flood prone village, kharif paddy, always at the 
risk of a wash out, is a low-input-low-output affair. But farm-
ers grow mustard, potato or vegetables soon after kharif 
paddy and then grow their main crop of summer paddy. This 
input and irrigation intensive crop of summer paddy with an 
assured yield of around 7 mt/ha had a strong fillip during the 
1990s when the government supplied a large number of diesel 
pumps at subsidised rates. But now, summer paddy is on a 
decline, primarily thanks to soaring diesel prices. No matter 
how farm budgets are worked out, summer paddy does not 
generate any surplus for a farmer who views his farm as an 
economic enterprise. Therefore, most farmers in Keotkuchi 
who could find off-farm work have gone ahead and found it, 
sold off their diesel pumps at throw-away prices, and left 
farming to either large farmers or sharecroppers. The village 
is surrounded by villages full of hard-working landless Ban-
gladeshi Muslims whose priorities are two: food security by 
growing their own rice; and putting their free family labour to 
productive use. They bought up the diesel pumps from Keotkuchi’s 
yesterday farmers at throw-away prices, leased their paddy land 
in the summer, and irrigated their summer paddy with kerosene 
or a kerosene-diesel mix. The other classes of farmers who 
have survived the energy squeeze are large farmers who can 
invest in electric pumps, diesel pumps, tractors and gensets and 
optimise on irrigation cost as well as quality.1  
A similar hierarchy of exit from farming was noted in the 
more mechanised agriculture of Punjab, Haryana and Madhya 
Pradesh. Here, soaring diesel prices have been affecting small-
holder farming through its leveraged impact not only on pump 
irrigation but also on the hiring rates of other machine ser-
vices, mainly ploughing and threshing. With water tables down 
to 60-70 feet, 150-300 feet deep tubewells with submersible 
pumps are needed to access groundwater irrigation. The invest-
ment required may exceed Rs 1.2 lakh, and only large and 
some medium farmers are able to afford such investments. 
Since tractors are often used to run generator sets, farmers who 
have tractors and deep tubewells with submersible pumps 
enjoy economies of scope in the agrarian economy. Small 
farmers who depend on rentals of all machines find the going 
tough. Since electric tubewell owners hardly get enough elec-
tricity to irrigate their own fields, their customers have to 
contend with “gen-set irrigation” which may cost up to Rs 1,100 
per day to water four to five hectares. In our study village in 
Malwa, giving five irrigations to a bigha of wheat with a 
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tractor-powered gen-set can cost upwards of Rs 3,500, at which 
cost wheat cultivation becomes an unviable proposition. So 
only those farmers that have electric pumps or can crop-share with 
electric pump owners grow wheat. The rest turn to “rainfed” crops 
or quit farming. In response to squeezed margins in farming, 
many smallholders in Punjab and Haryana have been leasing 
out parts or all of their holdings to even poorer migrant labour-
ers from Bihar and Madhya Pradesh at Rs 8,000-9,000 per acre 
of flat rent, while they themselves move to off-farm jobs. The 
migrant labourers, whose first concern is to receive full-
employment wage rates, rather than profit, make their farming 
viable through substituting muscle power for machine power 
and through super-intensive cultivation of high value crops for 
the market. It is these reverse migrants into farming and 
marginal farmers unable to find off-farm livelihoods who are 
bearing the brunt of the energy squeeze.  
At the bottom of the agrarian pyramid, the energy squeeze 
(and the cropping pattern changes it is bringing about) is in-
fluencing women’s role in the agrarian economies in myriad 
ways. In Murshidabad, we found that the decline in boro cul-
tivation curtailed the rice-boiling cottage industry that is 
dominated and controlled by poor women. In the Deoria vil-
lage, decline in paddy area reduced demand for female labour 
for transplanting work; women here took to goat rearing. In 
Abakpur Monga in Mirzapur, Uttar Pradesh, expansion in 
vegetable crops, especially peas, has increased demand for 
labour and created new employment opportunities and higher 
wage rates for poor women labourers. And almost everywhere, 
we found the energy squeeze on irrigated agriculture increasing 
the role of livestock and dairying, further transforming the 
position of women in the household economies of the poor.
V
Chinese Pumps to Aid of Bengal’s Agrarian Poor
 
In West Bengal, help has come to the “energy squeezed” 
farmer from unlikely quarters: Chinese kerosene-cum-diesel 
pumps. Boro rice is far more intensive in working capital, 
labour and irrigation but it is land-saving and therefore appeal-
ing to marginal farmers and sharecroppers. It offers 7 mt/ha 
of rice yield against barely 1-1.5 mt/ha rainfed amon (kharif) 
rice. Growing a small parcel of boro rice may liberate a farm-
ing family from subsistence worries for the whole year, and it 
is therefore prized by the poor. For the want of better alterna-
tives, such as electric pumps, West Bengal’s marginal farmers 
have been switching to Chinese pumps with gusto. They are 
cheap, costing Rs 7,000 and Rs 8,500 for 3.5 and 5 hp against 
Rs 16,000 for a 5 hp Kirloskar. The Chinese 5 hp pump runs 
for two hours from a litre of diesel, which a Kirloskar 5 hp 
burns up in an hour or less. Finally, while a Kirloskar needs 
a bullock cart to move around, the Chinese pump can be eas-
ily carried by a farmer on his shoulders. 
In just five years, Chinese pumps have captured the irrigation 
pump market in West Bengal. In Murshidabad, all 30 diesel 
run shallows in Kaya, our study village, used Chinese pumps. 
The boro rice boom here was originally fed way back in the 
1970s and 1980s, by cooperative tubewells with electric pumps 
founded by an NGO; the co-ops failed, as they elsewhere did 
[Pant 1984; Ballabh 1989]. But the boro rice boom continued 
during the 1990s with the help of Kirsloskar pumps. But at 
ruling diesel price, the Kirloskar is considered “fit for a compost 
pit”; and the Chinese pump is riding a wave of popularity.
How the Chinese pumps made in-roads into West Bengal’s 
irrigation scene remains something of a mystery. Apparently, some 
second-hand Chinese pumps smuggled across the Bangladesh 
border caught the farmers’ fancy, and soon enough, there followed 
a deluge of Chinese pumps smuggled across the Bangladesh 
border. It was only a matter of time before official imports 
began in 1998. Now, out of every 100 new diesel pump as-
semblies purchased in these parts of West Bengal, over 90 have 
Chinese engines. Kolkata has emerged as the epicentre of Chi-
nese pump diffusion. Several brands of Chinese and Chinese-
Indian pump assemblies are on offer here (Greeves China, 
Tricircle China, GK200, Chhanta China, Zenith China, Changfa 
China, ZL 175 China, etc). All these are selling at 35-40 per cent 
of the price of Kirloskar 4 and 5 hp engines, which remained 
market leaders for decades, and Honda 4 hp pumps. Interviews 
with pump dealers in Kolkata confirmed that farmers preferred 
these for their low price, their much higher fuel efficiency 
(0.35-0.4 l/hour), ability to work on kerosene, and easy porta-
bility. Chinese pumps suffer more wear and tear and have a 
shorter life, but Chinese pump mechanics have come up in every 
village, and their spare parts are cheaper and easily available. 
VI
PDS Kerosene: For Kitchen or Farm?
Close on the heels of Chinese pumps, a new trend has emerged 
throughout India – that of using subsidised public distribution 
system (PDS)2  kerosene meant for cooking for running irriga-
tion pumps. Against the fact that it reduces the life of the engine, 
poor farmers see two advantages in using kerosene: first, PDS 
kerosene, subsidised as a cooking fuel, is cheaper than diesel; 
and second, when used with Chinese pumps, it yields more 
water per litre, ceteris paribus. Extensive use of kerosene and 
crude oil to run diesel pumps is the litmus test of how hard 
the energy squeeze pinches pump irrigators. Some engines, 
particularly Chinese ones, are designed to use diesel as well as 
kerosene. In Kalahandi (Orissa) villages, we found that marginal 
mali farmers, traditional vegetable growers, have disposed of 
their diesel engines and taken to 1.5 hp kerosene pumps for 
irrigating an onion crop through 3’*2’ kyari’s on a 0.25-0.5 ha 
parcel of land. But we found scheduled caste marginal farmers 
in Birbhum running even Kirloskars on kerosene, “In what way 
can you call this a diesel pump?”, they said about their pumps.
In many parts of eastern India, collecting PDS quota subsi-
dised kerosene meant for cooking and storing it for irrigating 
a rabi or summer crop has increasingly become a standard 
operating procedure for many poor households. Sharecroppers 
and marginal farmers with large families have special advan-
tages as well as compulsions: large family means more kerosene 
allotment from fair price shops. It also means freedom from 
using hired labour at peak wage rates. A large family also 
means urgency in growing boro rice for family subsistence. 
PDS kerosene has emerged as a key player in West Bengal’s 
political economy of boro rice cultivation. Increasingly, the task 
of storing PDS kerosene for boro rice irrigation has been taken 
over by operators of PDS outlets themselves, who wait for the 
onset of the boro season to release their stockpile of PDS 
kerosene. With this, switching to kerosene too has ceased to be 
of much help since it is the traders who have begun to skim 
the cream in the black markets for PDS kerosene: between 1990 
and 2006, diesel prices went up from Rs 4/l to Rs 34.30/l in 
Murshidabad villages but kerosene prices in the black market 
rose from Rs 8/l to Rs 25/l, wiping out some of the cost advantage 
kerosene offered to the poor in fending off the energy squeeze. 
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VII
Diesel-efficient Irrigation Options
Expectedly, the rise in pump irrigation costs has forced farm-
ers to search for diesel-efficient irrigation options including 
crop choices, irrigation techniques and fuel options. In the 
Rajkot villages in Gujarat, we found farmers adopting small-bed 
irrigation in winter crops such as cumin, gram and wheat, and 
alternate furrow irrigation for cotton. They told us that these 
can save 20-25 per cent diesel usage but reduce crop yield/
bigha by a quintal in cotton as well as wheat. In our UP village 
in the Mirzapur district, to save on irrigation costs, farmers 
have begun applying four irrigations to the rabi wheat crop 
rather than the five that they have been giving all these years. 
In our Birbhum village of West Bengal, we found many share 
croppers leasing in parcels just below their own land so as to 
use the water drained out of their boro paddy in raising another 
rice crop in the lower field. Many who were forced to give up 
boro cultivation all together due to high diesel costs increased 
their area under mustard crop during winter when water can be 
pumped or manually lifted, for a supplemental irrigation from 
ponds. In this new trend of replacing boro rice by rabi crops, 
irrigation cost relative to crop value has been a prime consid-
eration for small farmers choosing between mustard, wheat and 
potato. Mustard fetches better prices and requires less irrigation. 
Purchased diesel pump irrigation for rabi mustard may cost Rs 
200-250/bigha against Rs 1,500/bigha for boro rice. 
In our study village from Vidarbha, the system of rice intensi-
fication (SRI) was introduced some years ago as water-saving 
technology but after trying it for a few seasons, farmers found its 
labour requirement in weeding daunting and the SRI disappeared 
without a trace. However, many small farmers did switch to the 
practice of dividing their farms into small basins, roughly of 
200 sq m, at different heights for more efficient water, and diesel 
usage. In coastal Orissa’s Purana Pradhan village, the soaring 
diesel price has induced farmers to convey water from well-head 
to their fields either by flexible pipes or by masonry channels.
How the energy squeeze is heralding wholesale cropping 
pattern changes from diesel-intensive to diesel-saving crops 
was striking in the Simra village of Patna district, Bihar. In 
1990, this was a wholly rice-wheat village with little diversi-
fication away from this age-old rotation. Now, kharif paddy 
continues with or without irrigation but during rabi and sum-
mer, of its 300 ha, Simra has 150 ha under rainfed masoor, 50 
ha under lightly irrigated gram, 40 ha under wheat, and 75 
and 20 ha respectively under intensively irrigated onion and 
corriander, the last fetching them the highest return per acre 
as well as per litre of diesel/kerosene. In the eastern UP village, 
Akataha, farmers have switched from long duration to short 
duration paddy, and some irrigated paddy area has given way 
to diesel-saving groundnut and high-value potato crops.
VIII
Gambler’s Choice
Curiously, in several of our study areas, small farmers have 
responded to the diesel price squeeze by adopting even more 
diesel-intensive crops, mostly vegetables and sugar cane. In 
the eastern UP village, the highly profitable sugar cane cultiva-
tion has replaced some of the wheat and paddy area. This 
reflects farmers moving from a low-input-low-output strategy 
to a high-input-high-income one to survive the rising cash-
intensity of farming. This was most evident in the Abakpur 
Mobana village of the Mirzapur district in UP, where low-
value rainfed kharif crops are being increasingly replaced by 
high-value, lightly irrigated vegetable and groundnut crops. 
Here, 90 per cent of the farmland was under food crops (jowar, 
bajra, maize, gram, tun, wheat) in 1990. Today, 80-90 per cent 
of farmland is under cash crops, high-value vegetables and 
diesel-efficient groundnut. The vegetables most widely grown 
here are chilli, tomato, brinjal, onion and potato.
The primary driver of the high-risk, capital-intensive cropping 
strategy is the need to maximise the crop (and cash) per drop 
of diesel. In the Purana Pradhan village in Khurda district of 
coastal Orissa, Manas Satpathy computed that vegetables cost 
a lot more to cultivate in cash inputs than kharif or summer 
paddy but these also offer greater cash returns (Table 4). Some 
years ago, sugar cane was widely irrigated by diesel pumps but 
now vegetables are the most important crop irrigated by diesel 
pumps in this village because they yield the highest income per 
drop of diesel. Poorer farmers, whose main concern was foodgrain 
security for the family were cajoled into learning new skills of 
vegetable cultivation and of marketing it to maximise their 
household income. Such a family typically uses their family 
labour intensively – of men, women and children, on 1.5-2 
acres of leased in low-land and purchased pump irrigation from 
kerosene or electric pumps. Cooperation among low-land veg-
etable growers here is of paramount importance; if one of them 
chose to grow paddy, the water draining out of his field might 
ruin the near-by vegetable crop.
Another example of marginal farmers turning to risky high 
value crops was found in the Simra village (Patna, Bihar). Here, 
forced to give up winter wheat, share croppers and marginal 
farmers took to intensive cultivation on small plots of fully irri-
gated onion crop during the summer; it required a good deal of 
capital but its higher cash returns justified the investment. Initially, 
intensive onion cultivation in the summer began as a strategy 
to beat the rising cost of diesel pump irrigation of wheat and 
other crops but now, with the area under summer onion rising 
to a quarter of the village’s farmland, the crop stimulated more 
diesel pump purchases. Onion requires 13 irrigations to mature 
and diesel pump owners charge Rs 3,000/bigha (Rs 12,000/ha) as 
a fixed charge for onion irrigation. This high rate makes invest-
ment in a diesel pump highly attractive. Simra’s onion revolu-
tion looked like a way to beat the energy squeeze.
Often, however, such desperate risky choices have ended up 
as sure ways of getting nothing out of something. This happened 
to Simra’s onion economy, too. After some years of bumper 
returns, untimely summer rains ruined Simra’s onion crop in 
2005 and 2006, leaving the small tenants in a huge debt trap. 
While some gutsy smallholders will still keep experimenting 
with onion, chances are that most will steer clear of the high 
value but risky onion crop or choose some mix of onion and 
low-risk masoor to diversify the risk of being wiped out.
Similar was the experience in Birbhum. Struggling to survive, 
marginal farmers in Kaya, and surrounding villages took to 
vegetable cultivation for the market to make up for boro rice 
Table 4: Costs and Returns from Paddy and Vegetables, 
Khurda, Coastal Orissa
(Rs per acre)
 Cost of Cultivation  Net  Return   
 
Kharif paddy 3,500 2,500
Summer paddy 6,000 3,000
Vegetables 30,000 50,000
Source: From the Khurda case study. 
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voltage power supply to tubewells along a predetermined schedule. 
With some modification, this has the potential to contain 
power subsidy to manageable levels but beat the energy squeeze 
with which small holder irrigation in India is waging a losing 
battle today. By creating a regime in eastern India such as created 
by the Jyotirgram Yojana in Gujarat, the energy squeeze can be 
eased in a positive and proactive manner. Moreover, by giving 
marginal farmers priority in issuing new electricity connections 
for shallow and submersible tubewells, it is possible to gener-
ate equity benefits comparable to deep land reforms. Today, 
irrigation contributes as much to farm value creation as land, 
and giving the agrarian poor preferential control over electricity 
connections and groundwater, the last frontier, a bold policy 
can give them the opportunity land reforms could not. 
Email: t.shah@cgiar.org 
Notes
[The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support for this study 
from the Challenge Programme for Water and Food (CPWF) project on 
‘Strategic Analyses of India’s National River Linking Project’. An earlier 
version of this paper was presented in the IWMI-Tata Water Policy Pro-
gramme’s sixth annual partners’ meet during March 8-10, 2007. All the 15 
village studies carried out by the author’s research partners are available 
on www.iwmi.org/nrlp, or can be obtained by writing to the author.]
1 In Keotkuchi, the archetype of this latter class was Nirmal Chandra Das, 
who added 100 bigha of leased land to his own 60 bigha farm, gave up 
diesel-intensive summer paddy altogether and developed a diversified 
cropping patter in rabi to make his farming operation viable.
2 Public distribution system which issues kerosene as cooking fuel to 
ration card holders.
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that they had to give up. The switch proved highly remunera-
tive for small farmers with large families and a Chinese pump. 
At one stage, 25-30 per cent of Kaya’s farmlands were under 
vegetables. More recently, vegetable prices have been dropping 
due to a glut, and the rising cost of road transport, another 
result of hikes in diesel prices. In 2006, Kaya produced a 
surfeit of cabbage that nobody was willing to lift, and many 
frustrated farmers ploughed it back into their fields. Kaya 
farmers are now coming full circle and experimenting with an 
admixture of two extreme crop groups: one, consisting of 
hardy, water-saving crops like oilseeds, wheat and pulses that 
offer low but risk-free returns; and the other, including onion, 
coriander, black cumin that may offer better returns as cash 
crops but are full of price as well as output risks. 
IX
Conclusion
Smallholder irrigation in India is under siege from an energy 
squeeze with three sides: (a) deteriorating farm power supply; 
(b) embargo on new electricity connections; and (c) an eight-
fold increase in diesel prices since 1991. The government of 
India’s Accelerated Irrigation Benefits Programme is investing 
tens of thousands of crores annually in surface irrigation, which 
is shrinking. But the real challenge Indian agriculture faces 
today is that of helping smallholder irrigators out of the energy 
squeeze. This paper summarised 15 village studies from different 
parts of India to explore the immiserising impacts the energy 
squeeze is causing at the bottom of India’s agrarian economy.
What could be done to counter the energy squeeze? Several 
ideas emerge from farmers’ struggles. Promoting fuel-efficient 
diesel/kerosene pumps of the Chinese variety can ease the 
cost-price squeeze. Making PDS kerosene allocation to poor 
farmers, as in Kerala, too might help. The idea of providing 
subsidised diesel to farmers, as is done for trawler-operating 
fisherfolk in some states, too is doing rounds. Improving 
manual irrigation technologies and better management of sur-
face water bodies for gravity flow irrigation too can relieve 
the stress from the energy squeeze. Helping marginal farmers 
own pumps can help save them from the monopoly rents 
contained in prevailing pump irrigation prices.
However, all these must be treated as short-term patchwork. 
The real answer probably lies in improving electricity supply 
to agriculture. A 2004 IWMI-Tata study in eastern UP showed 
that increasing diesel pump density helps the poor water buyers 
a little but increasing electric pumps under flat tariff can “improve 
the net returns [from farming] of poor water buyers by 20-25 
per cent even if no yield gains are realised. Such a shift will 
have a huge impact in UP since 57 per cent of all food crop 
cultivators are water buyers here” [Kishore and Mishra 2004]. 
This is true not only for eastern UP but for all of eastern India. 
However, realising these gains for the poor requires a mindset-
change. The invidious political economy of power subsidies that 
have emerged in India over the past three decades have encouraged 
state governments and power utilities to view agriculture as a 
pariah. This needs to change. If Indian agriculture is to thrive 
and our agrarian poor to prosper, it is critical that farm power 
supply is managed proactively. The challenge here is to manage 
farm power subsidies to acceptable levels in a manner which 
relieves the stranglehold of the energy squeeze on smallholder 
irrigation. Perhaps, Gujarat’s Jyotirgram Yojana points at the 
way to go [Shah and Verma 2007]. Under this scheme, Gujarat 
electricity board offers eight hours daily of three phase, full 
EPW
